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In the last years, regulatory agencies of many countries in the world,
following recomendations of Basel Committee, have compeled ﬁnan-
cial institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements to cover
market and credit risks. This paper investigates the consequences
about social welfare, contagion and the bankruptcy probability of such
practice. We show that for each ﬁnancial institution there is a level of
regulation that maximizes its utility. Another important result asserts
that risk regulation decreases contagion and under certain conditions
can reduce the bankruptcy probability. We also analyze the trade-oﬀ
faced by regulators involving the ﬁnancial institutions welfare versus
bankruptcy and contagion probabilities.
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11 Introduction
In the last two decades, many regulatory agencies around the world have
introduced formal capital requirements to control banks risks based on the
recommendations of the 1988 Basel Accord on capital standards and its fol-
lowing amendments.
This Accord was the ﬁrst successful attempt to harmonize international
rules of bank capital1 and resulted from a process under the heading of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision2. The 1988 Basel Accord is a doc-
ument approved in July 1988 by the member countries of the Committee
establishing minimum capital requirements for credit risk. Basically, it im-
poses a capital requirement of at least 8% of the Risk-Adjusted Asset (RAA),
deﬁned as the sum of asset positions multiplied by asset-speciﬁc risk weights.
In January 1996, the Committee released a new document named Amend-
ment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, 1996a)3 deﬁning criteria for capital requirements to
cover market risk. Since then the minimum regulatory capital of a ﬁnancial
institution is the sum of an amounts to cover credit and market risks4. In
order to gauge market risk the Basel Committee adopted the well known
Value-at-Risk (VaR) metric5.
Regardless of legal requirements, several ﬁnancial institutions have re-
cently adopted internal VaR-based models for market risk management. Most
of this self-discipline process stemmed from demand of stockholders and in-
vestors who were concerned with the increase of volatility in a globalized
world and wanted transparency in the management of their resources.
Many recent studies have addressed the economic implications of the
1See Freixas and Santomero (2002) or Santos (2002) for a review of the theoretical
justiﬁcations for bank capital requirements.
2The Basel Committee was set up in 1974 under the auspices of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) by the central banks of the G10 members.
3For an overview on the Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market
Risk, see the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996b).
4Recently, the Basel Committee released another document, commonly known as Basel
II, that revises the original framework for setting capital charges for credit risk and intro-
duces capital charge to cover operational risk.
5VaR represents the maximum loss to which a portfolio is subject for a given conﬁdence
interval and time horizon. For instance, a one-day 99% VaR of R$ 10 million means that
there is only 1 in 100 chance of the portfolio loss to exceed R$ 10 million at the end of the
next business day. For an overview of VaR, see Duﬃe & Pan (1997).
2adoption of capital requirements based on the Basel Accord proposals. Ro-
chet (1992) analyzes the consequences of capital requirements on the portfolio
choices of banks and showed that the optimal risk weigth must be propor-
tional to the systemic risk of the assets (their betas). Jackson et. al (1999)
review the empirical evidence on the impact of the 1988 Basel Accord. Blum
(1999) point out that, in a dynamic framework, a capital intertemporal eﬀect
can arise which leads to an increase in bank’s risk. Marshall & Venkatara-
man (1999) use a simple model to evaluate alternative bank capital regu-
latory proposals for market risk. Basak & Shapiro (2001) investigate the
implications of the investment decision problem when the trader is subject
to an exogenous VaR limit. Dan´ ıelsson & Zigrand (2003) use an equilib-
rium model to study the implications on asset prices and variances due to
the introduction of a VaR-based risk regulation. Dan´ ıelsson et al. (2004)
extend the model proposed by Dan´ ıelsson & Zigrand (2003) to a multiperiod
environment and estimate the intensity of adverse impacts of VaR-based risk
constraint. Cuoco & Liu (2006) study the behavior of a ﬁnancial institution
subject to capital requirements based on self-reported VaR measures. Leip-
pold et al. (2006) consider the asset-pricing implications of VaR regulation
in incomplete continuous-time economies.
The aim of the present study is to investigate the welfare properties, the
bankruptcy probability and the contagion among ﬁnancial institutions in an
economy with capital requirements to cover risks using an equilibrium model
similar to one proposed by Dan´ ıelsson et al. (2003)6.
We start by analyzing the welfare eﬀects of the introduction of VaR-
based capital requirements. Surprisingly, we show that some institutions can
be better in a regulated economy (i.e., an economy where all ﬁnancial in-
stitutions must satisfy the risk regulation constraint) than an unregulated
economy (i.e., an economy where there are no risk limits). Another impor-
tant result states that a VaR-based risk regulation can reduce the ﬁnancial
fragility of the market, deﬁned as the sum of the bankruptcy probabilities
of all ﬁnancial agents. We also show that the tighter is the regulation, the
smaller is the probability of contagion. Next we consider an economy with
RAA-based risk constraint. In this context we show that if the weights are
misadjusted, besides to the decrease in the prices of risky assets, the regula-
6In the same spirit of Danielsson et al. (2003) we don’t model reasons to the presence
of risk regulation. Simply we suppose that it exists (probably due to a market failure) and
assess the economic consequence of it.
3tion can increase the bankruptcy probability of ﬁnancial institutions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the
ingredients of the model. Section 3 describes the VaR-based risk constraint
and establishes conditions for the existence of equilibrium. In Section 4 we
study the welfare of ﬁnancial institution in a regulated economy. Section 5
analyzes the total bankruptcy probability before and after the introduction
of a VaR-based risk regulation. In Section 6 we present a new approach to
evaluate the contagion in an economy with risk constraint. In Section 7 we
study through a simple example the problem of RAA-based risk regulation.
Section 8 concludes. Proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a two period economy (t = 0,1) according to proposed by Dan´ ıelsson
& Zigrand (2003). At t = 0 agents (ﬁnancial institutions) invest in N + 1
assets that mature at t = 1. The asset 0 is risk-free and yields payoﬀ d0. The











that follow a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ.





We follow common modelling practice by endowing ﬁnancial institutions
with their own utility functions (such as in Basak and Shapiro, 2001, for
instance). There is a continuum of small agents characterized by a constant
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion (CARA) h. The population of agents is
such that h is uniformly distributed on the interval [`,1]. To guarantee that
all agents are risk-averse, let us suppose that ` > 0.
Let xh and yh
i be the number of units of the risk-free asset and of the
risky asset i, respectively, held by ﬁnancial institution h at t = 0. Then the










The agents choose the portfolio that maximizes the expected value of




subject to budget and risk constraints.
The time-zero wealth of an agent of type h comprises initial endowments
in the risk-free asset, θ
h



























i is the initial wealth of agent h.
The role of the regulatory agency consists to limiting the set of invest-
ments opportunities in the risky assets. That is, the regulatory agency in-
troduces a new constraint (hereafter, denominated risk constraint) that can
be written as
y
h ∈ Υ, ∀h ∈ [`,1], (1)
for some Υ ⊆ RN. Of course, the regulatory agency’s aim is to choose Υ
so as to minimize the ﬁnancial fragility of the market, damaging as little as
possible the economy. Diﬀerent choices for Υ correspond to diﬀerent bank
capital regulatory proposals.




















As the budget constraint is homogeneous of degree zero in prices, we can
normalize, without loss of generality, the price of risk-free asset to q0 = 1.
Moreover, since uh is strictly increasing, the budget constraint must be bind.
7Hereafter, when there isn’t any doubt about the notation, for x ∈ R and y ∈ RN we
write simply (x,y) instead of (x,y0).
5The next lemma is a direct consequence of the properties of a continuous
function deﬁned on a compact set8.
Lemma 1 If Υ is compact and convex then the problem of ﬁnancial institu-
tion has only one solution.
A competitive equilibrium for the economy in question is an asset price








solves the problem of ﬁnancial institution h when assets prices
are equal to (q0,q0).
2. Market clears, that is,
R 1
` yhdh = θ and
R 1
` xhdh = θ0, where θ = R 1
` θ





the aggregate amount of risk-free asset.
3 VaR-Based Risk Constraint
Market risk is the risk that the value of an investment decreases due to
changes in market factors (like equity and commodities prices, interest rates
and rate of exchange). To asses the soundness of a ﬁnancial institution it’s
fundamental to measure its exposure to market risk. In recent years, the risk
metric knonw as VaR has become the major market risk metric for regulatory
purposes as well as a standard industry tool. Following this trend we suppose
that the regulatory agency make use of VaR to limit market risk of ﬁnancial



















where P is the probability measure corresponding to risky assets payoﬀ dis-
tribution, E is the expected value relative to this measure and α is the sig-
niﬁcance level adopted (the probability of losses exceeding the VaR)9.
8For an analysis of optimal portfolio choice with compact and convex constraints see
Elsinger & Summer (1999).
9VaR when deﬁned by Equation 2 is known as relative VaR, while the absolute VaR is
the VaR deﬁned without reference to the expected value (see Jorion, 2001).
6In a simple way, VaR is the loss, which is exceeded with some given
probability, α, over a given horizon. This easy interpretation is one of the
reasons that justify the large use of VaR as standard market risk metric10.
The risk constraint is ﬁxed as an uniform upper bound to VaR, that is,
V aR
α ≤ V aR, (3)
where V aR is a VaR exogenous bound set by the regulatory agency. By
using normal distribution properties, the risk constraint can be rewritten as








where the paramater ν, called nonseverity of the risk constraint, depends on
α and V aR.
The next proposition characterizes the solution of the problem of ﬁnan-
cial institutions. The demonstration of this proposition can be found in




be the solution of the problem of ﬁnancial insti-
tution h when the price vector of risky assets is q. We have:








−1 (µ − r0q), (5)
where ρ = (µ − r0q)
0 Σ−1 (µ − r0q) and r0 is the risk-free rate.









−1 (µ − r0q). (6)










10In spite of its widespread adoption, VaR is not without controversy. Its major problem
relies on the fact that it is not a coherent measure of risk (VaR fails the sub-additive
property, see Artzner et al., 1999). Besides, Kerkhof & Melenberg (2004) use a backtesting
procedure to show that expected shortfall, a coherent measure of risk, produces better
results than VaR.
7Note that the introduction of the risk constraint prevents optimal risk




After solving the problem of the ﬁnancial institutions, the market clears
condition automatically provides the equilibrium prices, as presented in the
following proposition (again, the demonstration is in Dan´ ıelsson & Zigrand,
2003).
Proposition 2 Suppose that Ri > r0 for all i = 1,...,N. Then, the equi-




(µ − ΨΣθ), (7)
where Ψ is the market price of risk scalar (see Dan´ ıelsson & Zigrand, 2003).




    
    
1
ln`−1 if 0 ≤ κ ≤ `ln`−1
− κ+`
κF(−(κ+`)e−1) if `ln`−1 < κ < 1 − `
any number ≥ 1









An equilibrium fails to exist if κ > 1 − `.
Figure 1 illustrates Ψ as a function of κ. When κ = 1−` the equilibrium is
undetermined. If equilibrium exists and at least one institution hits the risk
constraint then `ln`−1 < κ < 1−`, hence Ψ is a strictly increasing function
of κ and consequently a strictly decreasing function of ν. This implies that
the tighter is the regulation (that is, the smaller is ν) the less will be the risky
assets equilibrium prices as highlighted in Dan´ ıelsson & Zigrand (2003).
11The non-principal branch of the Lambert correspondence is the inverse of the function




deﬁned by f(x) = xex. For more details and properties of the
Lambert correspondence see Corless et al (1996).
8Figure 1: Illustration of Ψ.
4 Welfare of Financial Institutions
To measure the ﬁnancial institutions welfare we suppose that we have a
linear-in-utilitily social welfare function, also called Bergson welfare function
(see Varian, 1992), in which the weigth of each agent is equal to the inverse
of its CARA. That is, we suppose that the regulatory agency consider more
important the ﬁnancial institutions less risk averse. Of course, other schemes
can be considered such as assigning the same weights for all institutions or




h∈[`,1] be an equilibrium allocation for the econ-
omy under analysis. We deﬁne the ﬁnancial institutions welfare function
by:













Proposition 3 Suppose that for the economy considered here equilibrium
exists and at least one ﬁnancial institution hits the risk constraint. Then the
ﬁnancial institutions welfare function is given by:






2 − (` + κ)κΨ + `
2
9Proposition 4 If equilibrium exists and at least one ﬁnancial institution hits
the risk constraint, the ﬁnancial institutions welfare function is increasing in
ν.
Proposition 4 tells us that the tighter is the risk regulation the lower is
the welfare of ﬁnancial institutions as a whole. But, what happens at indi-
vidual level? Would it be possible for a ﬁnancial institution to increase its
welfare in a regulated economy? Proposition 5 (below) states that, under
certain conditions, the answer to the last question is positive. The intuition
is immediate: At a regulated economy, agents little risk averse decrease their
positions in riskier assets, then prices of these assets fall, which makes in-
teresting for other agents to buy them, thus increasing these agents’ utility.
Therefore, each ﬁnancial institution maximizes its utility for a certain value
of the nonseverity parameter that doesn’t correspond necessarily to the sit-
uation of an unregulated economy (ν = ∞). Before presenting Proposition
5 we are going to estabilish some preliminary calculations and notations.
Denote by ν the maximum value of ν such as at least one institution hits




2 and ν = θ0Σθ
(1−`)2.
Consider the following functions:







2. g2(ν) : [ν,ν] 7→ [`,1], deﬁned by g2(ν) = κΨ and





, deﬁned by g3(ν) = Ψ(1 − `);










F (−(κ + `)e−1) + 1

.
It is easy to see that g1 (ν) = g2 (ν) = g3 (ν) = 1. Since κ, Ψ and Ψ0 are
strictly decreasing functions of ν12 we have that g1, g2 and g3 are strictly
decreasing function of ν too. Figure 2 shows graphs of these three functions.
12Ψ0 is a decreasing function of ν because Ψ(κ) is a convex function, thus Ψ00 (κ) > 0.
Hence Ψ0 (κ) is increasing in κ and therefore decreasing in ν.
10Figure 2: Graphs of functions g1, g2 and g3.
If we ﬁx the market parameters (Σ and µ) then the welfare of ﬁnancial





















Therefore, in equilbrium, the welfare of institution h depends on the
nonseverity parameter ν. If the aggregate endowment of the risky assets is
uniformly distributed between all agents (that is, θ
h = θ
1−`) then, after some
algebraic manipulations, it is possible to show that analyzing the welfare of
institution h as function of ν is equivalent to studying the function fh(ν) :


















The higher is fh(ν), the greater is the welfare of institution h.
Now we are able to present the main result of this Section.
Proposition 5 Let fh(ν) deﬁned by Equation 9, then:
1. For 1−`
ln`−1 < h ≤ 1 we have
• If g
−1
3 (h) < ν ≤ ν then fh(ν) is strictly increasing.
11• If g
−1
2 (h) < ν ≤ g
−1
3 (h) then fh(ν) is strictly decreasing.
• If g
−1
1 (h) < ν ≤ g
−1
2 (h) then fh(ν) is strictly decreasing.
• If ν < ν ≤ g
−1
1 (h) then fh(ν) is strictly increasing.




2 (h) < ν ≤ ν then fh(ν) is strictly decreasing.
• If g
−1
1 (h) < ν ≤ g
−1
2 (h) then fh(ν) is strictly decreasing.
• If ν < ν ≤ g
−1
1 (h) then fh(ν) is strictly increasing.







and fh(ν) = − h
2(1−`)2
The next proposition shows that between the tightest level (ν = ν) and
the softest level (ν = ν) of regulation, all ﬁnancial institutions prefer the last
one.
Proposition 6 For all h we have fh(ν) ≥ fh(ν).
By Proposition 6 we have that if ` ≤ h ≤ 1−`
ln`−1 then the maximum of
fh(ν) occurs when ν = g
−1
1 (h). However, if 1−`
ln`−1 < h ≤ 1 there are two
possible candidates for the maximum of fh(ν): the same g
−1
1 (h) or ν. The
next proposition gives conditions that allow us to decide in which of these
points the function fh(ν) assumes its maximum.
























where κ and Ψ are calculated at ν = g
−1
1 (h). The function t(h) is strictly
decreasing and has only one root. Denoting by h∗ this root we have
1. If 1−`
ln`−1 ≤ h ≤ h∗ then the maximum of fh(ν) occurs when ν = g
−1
1 (h).
2. If h∗ ≤ h ≤ 1 then the maximum of fh(ν) occurs when ν = ν.











Figure 4: Optimum level of regulation (ν) as a function of h.









and h ∈ [h∗,1].
Observe that if h < h∗ the ﬁnancial institution h prefers the regulation
to be ﬁxed in a speciﬁc level ν < ν. If h > h∗ then ﬁnancial institutions h
prefers no regulation (that is, ν ≥ ν). The reasoning behind it is very simple:
to get beneﬁt with the regulation these ﬁnancial institutions would prefer a
level of regulation tighter than ν, but in this case there isn’t equilibrium.
Since it is impossible, they have no gain with regulation hence they prefer
ν = ν. Figure 4 shows the optimum ν as a function of h.
135 Bankruptcy Probability
The ﬁnancial institution h goes to bankrupty if its wealth at t = 1 is less than
or equal to zero. If equilibrium exists and at least one institution reaches the















where mh = r0W h
0 + Ψθ
0Σyh and sh =
p
yh0Σyh are, respectively, the mean
and the standard deviation of W h
1 , and Φ represents the cumulative standard
normal distribution function. Since Φ is strictly increasing, to analyze the
behavior of pbh as a function of the nonseverity parameter ν, it is enough
to study how mh
sh varies when the regulatory agency modiﬁes ν. The greater
is this quotient, the less is the default probability of institution h. Using
Propositions 1 and 2 it is easy to see that in equilibrium we have






































Proposition 8 Assume that equilibrium exists and at least one institution
hits the risk constraint. Let ˜ ν be the nonseverity parameter value such as




θ0Σθ . That is, considering Ψ as function of ν we have




(if ˜ Ψ ≤ 1
ln`−1 set ˜ ν = ν and if ˜ Ψ ≥ 1
1−` set ˜ ν = ν).
141. If ˜ ν ≤ g
−1
2 (h) then mh














2 (h) < ˜ ν ≤ ν then mh
sh is a decreasing function of ν on the interval
[ν,˜ ν] and is an increasing function of ν on the interval [˜ ν,ν].
3. If ˜ ν > ν then mh
sh is a decreasing function of ν.
Proposition 8 gives interesting conclusions on the eﬀectiveness of the risk
regulation (eﬀectiveness is understood here as the reduction of the bankruptcy
probability):
1. The greater is W h
0 , the less is ˜ ν. Then if the institution is highly
capitalized, the regulation can increase its bankruptcy probability. On
the other hand, if the net worth of an institution is small, then, from
the regulatory agency point of view, the regulation is always beneﬁcial,
since the more severe it is, the less is the default probability of the
institution.
2. The more nervous is the market, the more eﬀective will be the regula-
tion.
3. The regulation is more eﬀective for the institutions little risk averse
(small h). If the institution will be super conservative then the regula-
tion can increase its bankruptcy probability.
Figure 5 presents the graphs of mh
sh (solid line) for cases 1 and 3 of Propo-
sition 8. The horizontal dash-dot line represents the same relation in an
unregulated economy.
Evidently, the regulatory agency must consider the system as a whole
and not an institution in particular. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze
the total bankruptcy probability, deﬁned as the sum (integral) of the default






Directly related (and more treatable from the algebraic point of view)








15Figure 5: Graphs of the function mh
sh . In (a) ˜ ν ≤ g
−1
2 (h) and in (b) ˜ ν > ν.
If the initial endowment of the assets is uniformly distributed between
the agents, then W h

















The ﬁrst and the second terms of the left side of Equation 12 are, respectively,
increasing and decreasing functions of ν. Then the phenomenon already ob-
served individually happens again in global level: If the level of capitalization
of the ﬁnancial institutions is high or the degree of market nervousness is low,
then the regulation can have contrary eﬀect to the planned (that is, to in-
crease the ﬁnancial fragility of the institutions). On the other hand, if the
institutions have a small initial wealth or the market is nervous then the
risk regulation presents the beneﬁt to diminish the number of bankruptcies.
Figure 6 shows these two situations.
6 Financial Market Contagion
In this section we analyze the problem of ﬁnancial market contagion. Con-
tagion is the transmission of shocks to other ﬁnancial institutions, beyond
any fundamental link among the institutions and beyond common shocks.
Contagion can take place both during “good times” and “bad times”. Then,
contagion does not need to be related to crises. However, contagion has been
emphasized during crisis times. Examples of recent contagious episodes are
16Figure 6: Graphs of the function Λs. In letter (a) the level of capitalization
of the ﬁnancial institutions is high and in letter (b) the opposite occurs.
the Tequila crisis of 1994-95, the East Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian
crisis of 1998 (for details about these episodes see Kaminsky & Reinhart,
1998).
Based on the model presented in Section 2 we develop a new approach
to evaluate the contagion in an economy in which ﬁnancial institutions are
subject to VaR-based risk constraint. We are not aware of any work that
studies this question from an equilibrium point of view13. To introduce the
possibility of contagion we increase the portfolios space of each ﬁnancial in-
stitution allowing investments among them. To avoid an inﬁnite dimensional
optimization problem, instead of a continuum of ﬁnancial institutions con-
sidered in the basic model we suppose that there is a ﬁnite number of them.
Let’s describe in more details a simple version of the contagion model where
there is only three ﬁnancial institutions. Generalizations of this particular
case are immediate.
Consider a two period economy with three ﬁnancial institutions A, B and
C. There is two risky assets with payoﬀ d normaly distributed. To make
investments of one ﬁnancial institution in another interesting we have to
introduce a friction on the market. There are many ways to do this. Here
we opt to prevent that some ﬁnancial institutions have access to the whole
ﬁnancial market. More speciﬁcally, ﬁnancial institution C can invest in both
13Tsomocos (2003) characterizes contagion and ﬁnancial fragility as an equilibrium phe-
nomenon but he doesn’t analyze the properties of this equilibrium.
17Figure 7: Financial market contagion model.
risky assets and in the risk-free asset. Its portfolio is (xc,c1,c2), where xc is
number of units of the risk-free asset held by C and c = (c1,c2)0 is the risky







institution B can invest in the risky asset 1, in the risk-free asset and in
ﬁnancial institution C. Its portfolio is (xB,b1,zBC) where zBC is the sharing




1 ). Finally, ﬁnancial institution
A can invest only in B and C and in the risk-free asset. Its portfolio is
(xA,zAB,zAC) where zAB is the sharing of A in B and zAC is the sharing
of A in C and its initial endowment is θ
A
0 . The CARA of these ﬁnancial
institutions are hC, hB and hA, respectively. To avoid situations where a
ﬁnancial institution fully buy another institution we suppose hA ≥ hB ≥ hC.
Figure 7 illustrate the model.
The wealths of institutions at t = 1 are
WC = r0xC + d · c,
WB = r0xB + d1b1 + zBCWC
= r0xB + zBCr0xC + d · β and
WA = r0xA + zABWB + zACWC










































1 are the equity capital of C and
B, respectively.
The risk constraints for A, B and C are respectively:
c0Σc ≤ ν,
β
0Σβ ≤ ν and
α0Σα ≤ ν.
Each institution maximizes the expected value of its wealth utility sub-
ject to the budget and risk constraints. To solve the problem of ﬁnancial
institutions we proceed in the same way that was done in Section 2. If the
risky asset price is q, then the optimum portfolios are:
1. For ﬁnancial institution C:









where ρC = e0
CΣ−1eC and eC = (µ − r0q).










192. For ﬁnancial institution B:










where ρB = e0
B (BΣB
0)
−1 eB, eB = (µ1 − r0q1,(µ − r0q) · c)
0,



















3. For ﬁnancial institution A:














eA = ((µ1 − r0q1)b1 + zBC(µ − r0q) · c,(µ − r0q) · c)




















To ﬁnd the equilibrium prices we have to use the market clears condition:





c2 = θ2 = θ
C
2
20To solve this system we have to use the MatLab fsolve function since the
system is non-linear and there isn’t a closed form solution.
Now we are ready to deﬁne metrics of contagion that allow us to evaluate
the impact of risk regulation on the ﬁnancial institutions contagion. Since
WA, WB and WC are normal with mean and variance known it is easy to
compute the following probabilities:
pA ≡ P [WA ≤ 0],
pB ≡ P [WB ≤ 0] and
pC ≡ P [WC ≤ 0].
Besides the probabilities above, to measure the contagion we need to com-
pute conditional probabilities like P [Wi ≤ 0 ∩ Wj ≤ 0] where i,j = A,B,C.
Let DBC be the region of the payoﬀ plane such as
c · d ≤ −r0xC
β · d ≤ −r0xB − r0zBCxC
then




where N (µ,Σ) is the density probability function of a bidimensional normal
distribution with mean vector µ and covariance matrix Σ.
Let DAC be the region of the payoﬀ plane such as
c · d ≤ −r0xC
α · d ≤ −r0xA − r0zABxB − r0(zAC + zABzBC)
then




Finally, let DAB be the region of the payoﬀ plane such as
β · d ≤ −r0xB − r0zBCxC
α · d ≤ −r0xA − r0zABxB − r0(zAC + zABzBC)
21then




We deﬁne the contagion metric of institution i on institution j (i > j
in a lexicographic order i,j = A,B,C) by the bankruptcy probability of j
conditional on the bankruptcy probability of i, that is












The contagion metrics CCB, CAC and CAB are increasing functions of
the nonseverity parameter ν. In other words the tighter is the regula-
tion the smaller is the contagion. Figure 8 illutrates CCB for ` = 0.0011,
θ = (1.5,0.9)
0, µ = (1.5,1.2)









In Section 4 we show that for each institution there is a value of ν that
maximizes its utility. The same question about the optimum level of regula-
tion for each ﬁnancial institution can be done to an economy with possibility
of contagion. Let νh be the value of the nonseverity parameter that maxi-
mizes the utility function of ﬁnancial institution h. That is,





where Wh is the wealth of ﬁnancial institution h at t = 1 in an equilibrium
allocation.
Of course, since ﬁnancial institution C is the less risk averse of all, it
has no beneﬁt with regulation, that is, νhC = ∞. For institutions B and C
νh depends on factors like market conditions and the diﬀerence among the
coeﬃcients of risk aversion. Let’s analyze in more details νhB when these
factors varies. The analysis of νhA is very similar and we don’t show it here.
22Figure 8: Contagion probability of C on B.
On the one hand ﬁnancial institution B prefer a tight level of regulation.
For example, since B invests on C, B would like that C doesn’t take excessive
risk to prevent that C go to bankrupt. Also, if asset 1 volatility is greater
than asset 2 volatility then regulation is beneﬁcial to B since the only way
that B has to invest on asset 2 is investing in C and the regulation can
lead C to concentrate its portfolio on asset 2. On the other hand, it is
possible, for example, that institution B wishes to invest a large amount on
asset 2 and the preferences of B and C are very similar (that is, hB ≈ hC).
But asset 2 is accessible only to institution C which has an upper limit
on its investments in asset 2 and institution B has an upper limit on its
investments in institution C. Then, in equilibrium, the number of units of
asset 2 eﬀectively hold by institution B can be smaller than in unregulated
economy. In this case institution B prefers a soft level of regulation.
Table 1 shows values of νB as a function of hB, hC, asset 1 variance and
asset 2 variance14. The other model parameters are ﬁxed and equal to the
values used in the exercise described in Figure 8.
The tightest level of regulation that B prefers occurs when the diﬀerence
between hB and hC is great and asset 1 is much more volatile than asset
2. In this case ﬁnancial institution B strongly prefer regulation because it
makes the portfolio of C concentrated on asset 2. But if the preferences
14Since there isn’t a closed form solution to the problem deﬁned by Equation 22, in this




0.4 0.1 0.8 0.2 1.12
0.4 0.1 0.6 0.4 1.88
0.4 0.1 0.2 0.6 2.43
0.3 0.26 0.2 0.25 4.57
0.27 0.26 0.01 0.25 7.93
Table 1: Diﬀerent values of νB as a function of the model’s parameters.
of B and C are very similar and the asset 1 variance is very small then
regulation is undesirable for ﬁnancial institution B since it adversely aﬀects
C and consequently B too.
Observe that in an economy with contagion and an incomplete asset struc-
ture, institution B wants that institution C has preferences very similar to
its own. But we showed in Section 2 that regulation can aﬀect the eﬀective
degree of risk aversion. Then what B wishes is that the regulation makes the
C eﬀective degree of risk aversion equal to its own.
7 RAA-Based Risk Constraint
In this Section we study the economic eﬀects of the capital requirement for
covering risk based on the RAA scheme. The model is the same presented in
Section 2. This model, despite its simplicity, is suﬃciently ﬂexible to cover a
series of interesting situations. In contrast to the deep analysis of VaR-based
risk regulation, in the study of RAA-based regulation we will work in a more
informal way. The main conclusions will be extracted from simple numerical
examples.
The Basel proposal for covering credit risk consists in using what is known
by Risk-Adjusted Assets. Basically, the idea is to separate the assets of the
ﬁnancial institutions in I groups and to apply in each group an asset-speciﬁc
risk weight. The positions bought and sold in diﬀerent assets must be added
in absolute value. The result of this account is the RAA. The RAA must be
less than or equal to a fraction of the institution net worth.









where β = (β1,...,βN) ∈ RN
++ are weight factors. Of course, if N > I then
24Figure 9: RAA-based risk constraint (N = 2).
at least two β’s are equal, that is, if there is more assets than groups then at
least two assets have the same weight factor.
When we have only two risky assets and the prices of these assets are
positive then the risk constraint is a lozenge as illustrated in Figure 9. The
institution h problem can be written as
Min (r0q − µ)


















2 ≤ W h
0
Hence, to solve the previous problem we have to consider nine diﬀer-
ent cases (depending on which restrictions are active in the optimum). For
example, yh = 1
hΣ−1 (µ − r0q) is an interior solution for this problem.
In order to avoid a tedious sequence of calculations in the same way that it
was done for VaR-based risk constraint, we are going to restrict our analysis
to a particular example. Suppose N = 2, θ
h = (1.9,0.5)
0 /(1 − `) for all h,








Figure 10: Prices of assets 1 e 2 with RAA-based risk constraint.
Figure 10 presents the equilibrium prices of assets 1 and 2 as function
of β1 (β2 ﬁxed and equal to 0.25). Note that these prices are decreasing
functions of the weight factor of asset 116. Figure 11 illustrates the default
probability of ﬁnancial institutions as function of its CARA. Observe that the
bankrupt probability of institutions less risk averse is higher in a regulated
economy. For β1 = 0.1 the regulatory agency was not very sucessful in
the choosing the weight factors once the charge to cover risk of asset 1 is
smaller than the charger to cover risk of asset 2 and the variance of asset 1 is
greater than the variance of asset 2. In this case the regulation is prejudicial
since all ﬁnancial institution hold riskier portfolio than in an unregulated
economy. Figure 12 presents the total bankruptcy probability (the sum of
the bankrupt probabilities of all institutions) as function of β1. We consider
only β1 > β2 = 0.25 since asset 1 is riskier than asset 2. Note that the total
15Once more, we use MatLab fsolve function to ﬁnd the equilibrium problem.
16For comparasion purposes, the prices of assets 1 and 2 in an unregulated economy
(that is β1 = β2 = 0) are 1.31 and 1.10, respectively.
26Figure 11: Default probability of institution h for an unregulated economy
and for β1 = 0.1, 0.5 and 0.8 (β2 = 0.25).
Figure 12: Total bankruptcy probability as a function of β1.
bankrutcy probability is a decreasing function of β1. This example shows the
importance of a good calibration of the weight factors since the RAA-based
regutation can increase the bankrutpcy probability of some institutions.
278 Conclusion
The primary aim of this work was to analyze the welfare properties in an
economy where ﬁnancial institutions are subject to a VaR-based risk regula-
tion. Firstly, we determined for each institution the level of regulation that
maximizes its utility. We showed that this level is not necessarily equivalent
to the absence of regulation.
To determine the intensity of the risk regulation, the regulatory agency
must take into account the bankruptcy probability of the ﬁnancial institu-
tions. We showed that if the net worth of a ﬁnancial institution is low or
the market volatility is high or yet the institution is little risk averse then
the VaR-based risk regulation can decrease its bankruptcy probability. Also
we saw that VaR-based risk regulation can decrease the contagion in the
economy.
Hence, the regulatory agency face a trade-oﬀ between:
1. Fixing ν (the upper limit for the portfolio variance of all ﬁnancial insti-
tutions) suﬃciently small in order to control the bankruptcy probability
and the contagion probability; and
2. Fixing ν suﬃciently large in order to not impact the ﬁnancial institu-
tions welfare.
When the risk constraint is based on RAA scheme we showed that it is
important that the regulatory agency set appropriately the risk weights since
the RAA-based regulation increases the ﬁnancial fragility of the institutions
very risk averse in a regulated economy.
28Appendix - Proofs of Propositons
Proof of Proposition 3









or, equivalently ` ≥ κΨ =
pρ
























































Proof of Proposition 4
Since κ is a decreasing function of ν and Ψ is an increasing function of κ,
to show that Λ is an increasing function of ν is suﬃcient to show that
f(κ) = (κΨ)
2 − 2(` + κ)κΨ + `
2
is a decreasing function of κ. Consider the quadratic polynomial p(x) =
x2 − 2(` + κ)x + `2. This polynomial have two positive real roots:
x1 = ` + κ −
√
κ2 + 2κ` and x2 = ` + κ +
√
κ2 + 2κ`.
17Since agents have a constant absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient, without loss of gener-
ality, we can suppose that the utility of institution h has the form uh (x) = −e−hx.
29Figure 13: Polynomial p(x) = x2 − 2(` + κ)x + `2 (κ1 < κ2).
When κ increases x1 decreases and x2 increases (see Figure 13). Since κΨ
is an increasing function of κ and κΨ < κ + ` follows that when κ increases,
(κΨ)2 − (` + κ)κΨ + `2 decreases. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Since κ is a strictly decreasing function of ν, to verify the intervals where
fh(ν) is increasing or decreasing it is enough to analyze fh as a function of
κ.
If ν ≤ ν ≤ g
−1
























∂κ < 0 hence fh is a strictly decreasing function of
κ and therefore a strictly increasing function of ν. Case g
−1
1 (h) ≤ ν ≤ g
−1
2 (h),
a similar argument shows that fh is a strictly decreasing function of ν.
If g
−1













We have to consider two cases:
301. If ` ≤ h ≤ 1−`
ln`−1 then g3(ν) > h. Therefore
∂fh
∂κ > 0 then fh is a strictly
increasing function of κ and a strictly decreasing of ν.
2. If 1−`
ln`−1 ≤ h ≤ 1 then the equation g3(ν) = h has only one solution.
Therefore, if g
−1
3 (h) < ν ≤ ν then fh is strictly increasing function of
ν. On the other hand, if g
−1
2 (h) < ν ≤ g
−1
3 (h) then fh is a strictly
decreasing function of ν.

Proof of Proposition 6















But the minimum of the left side of the previous equation occurs at
h = 1−`
ln`−1 and is equal to 1
(1−`)(ln`−1). 
Proof of Proposition 7
The function t(h) is continuous, moreover using the elementary diﬀeren-







2. t(1) < 0.






. To show that it is the only root we have to prove that
t(h) is strictly decreasing. We can write t(h) as the diﬀerence between two















































∂h = − 1
2(1−`)2.
h h
The other aﬃrmations of the proposition are immediate consequences of
the behavior of t(h). 
Proof of Proposition 8





















∂ν < 0 and ∂Ψ



























Hence, when ν ≤ ˜ ν we have
∂ mh
sh
∂ν < 0 and when ν ≥ ˜ ν we have
∂ mh
sh
∂ν > 0. 
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